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I. INTRODUCTION
The demise of the traditional Leave It To Beaver family is in full swing. No
longer is it the norm for mom to stay at home with the kids while dad works to
pay the bills. Today, in over 60% of American families, both spouses work
outside of the home.' By 2005, over 66% of American workers will be female.2
Over 65% of mothers and 96% of fathers are members of the paid labor force
Moreover, as a result of the recent advances in medicine and health care and the
aging of the baby boomer population, the elderly are the fastest growing segment
of the American population.' With Americans living longer, many children are
expected to care for their aging parents.5
In 1993, Congress and President Clinton responded to these changing
demographics by passing the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"). 6 The
FMLA acknowledges that situations may arise when employees must put their
family needs before their job responsibilities, and the Act responds by providing
these employees with job security and health insurance during such situations.7
* Associate Professor of Law, Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern
Kentucky University. B.A., 1990 Trinity University; J.D., 1993 Cornell Law School.
Special thanks to Rachel LeJeune.
** Associate, Boggs & Colvin, LLC (Florence, Kentucky). B.A., 1999 Furman
University; J.D., 2002 Salmon P. Chase College of Law, Northern Kentucky University.
1. See Sabra Craig, The Family and MedicalLeave Act of 1993: A Survey of the
Act's History,Purposes,Provisions,andSocialRamifications,44 DRAKE L. REV. 51, 52
(1995).
2. See Robert J. Aalberts & Lome H. Seidman, Employee Notice Requirements
Under the Family MedicalLeave Act: Are They Manageable?,24 PEPP. L. REv. 1209,
1210 (1997); S. REP. No. 103-3, at 5 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 8
(discussing the demographic changes which warranted the passage of the FMLA).
3. Donna Lenhoff & Claudia Withers, Implementation ofthe Family andMedical
Leave Act: Toward the Family-FriendlyWorkplace, 3 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 39, 48

(1994).
4. Id. at 48 n.64.
5. Id. at 48 n.65.
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
7. Lenhoff& Withers, supra note3, at49; see also 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(2) (2000)
(stating that the purpose of the FMLA is "to entitle employees to take reasonable leave
for medical reasons, for the birth or adoption of a child, and for the care of a child,
spouse, or parent who has a serious health condition").
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Unfortunately, however, the Act was drafted imperfectly,' and courts now are
stepping in to resolve its ambiguities.9 One such ambiguity concerns employer
notice requirements.
The FMLA explicitly requires employees to notify employers when
employees intend to take FMLA leave. While the statute requires employers to
post a sign informing employees in a general way about the FMLA, however,
it does not explicitly require employers to individually notify leave-taking
employees of how the FMLA works, or even to how much leave the employee
is entitled. Because the FMLA gives employers the option of designating
whether FMLA leave runs concurrently with, or consecutively to, the employer's
leave policy, problems may arise when the employer's leave policy is more
generous than the FMLA. Often, however, the employer makes no prospective
designation. The employee taking leave might assume that she is entitled to both
FMLA leave and leave under the employer's policy, only to find out too late that
the employer is treating the leave policies as running concurrently.
The Department of Labor ("DOL") attempted to solve this problem by
issuing regulations that require employers to designate up front whether or not
their leave policies run concurrently with FMLA leave, and to notify employees
of this designation. An employer that failed to comply with this prior notice
requirement would forfeit the opportunity to designate the two leave periods as
running concurrently. The effect would be that a non-notified employee would
be entitled to both the employer-provided leave and to an additional twelve
weeks of FMLA leave. Employers could easily avoid this situation, however,
merely by providing employees with pre-leave notice that FMLA leave would
run concurrently with employer-provided leave.
Prior to March 2002, federal circuit courts were divided over the question
of whether the DOL's penalty provision was consistent with the statutory

8. See Peggie R. Smith, Accommodating Routine ParentalObligationsin an Era
of Work-Family Conflict: Lessonsfrom ReligiousAccommodations, 2001 WIS. L. REv.
1443, 1443 (noting that "the FMLA leaves much to be desired"); Shay Ellen Zeemer,
Note, FMLA Notice Requirements and the Chevron Test: Maintaininga Hard-Fought
Balance, 55 VAND. L. REV. 261, 262 (2002) ("[T]he FMLA finds employees and
employers alike disillusioned, uncertain about rights and obligations, and still fighting
to balance work and family needs by being forced to follow the FMLA's complex
procedures."); see also Nevada Dep't of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir.
2001), cert.granted, 122 S.Ct. 2618 (2002) (granting certiorari on a case presenting the
issue of whether Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment when it gave state employees the right to sue their employers for violations
of the FMLA).
9. See Peter D. Lejeune, Employment Law, Manuel v. Westlake Polymers Corp.:
Must an Employee Specifically Mention the Family Medical Leave Act When the Need
for Protected Leave Is Unforeseeable?, 19 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 685 (1996).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/4
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language of the FMLA. The Fourth' ° and Sixth" Circuits accepted the DOL's
regulations and enforced the DOL's twelve-week penalty for noncompliance.
The Eighth 2 and Eleventh 3 Circuits, however, rejected these regulations,
holding that they were beyond Congress' intended scope of the legislation."4
In March 2002, the United States Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision in
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.," agreed with the Eighth and Eleventh
Circuits and held that the DOL's penalty for violation of its notice rule was
inconsistent with the statutory language of the FMLA.' 6 The Court expressly left
open the issue, however, of whether the DOL was within its statutory authority
when it imposed an employer notice requirement.' 7 Moreover, the Court's
opinion was ambiguous as to whether the DOL is prohibited from imposing any
penalty for noncompliance with notice requirements that would extend an
employee's leave beyond the twelve weeks provided in the statute, or whether,
alternatively, the DOL has the statutory authority to require individualized notice
so long as the remedy for noncompliance includes a showing of individualized
8

harm.1

This Article argues that DOL regulations should continue to require
employers to make a pre-leave designation of whether FMLA leave will run
concurrently with, or consecutive to, the employer's leave and give notice to
their employees, but that the penalty for an employer's noncompliance should
be modified to comply with the Supreme Court's Ragsdaledecision. Part II of
this Article provides a brief background of the substantive provisions of the
FMLA, notes the lack of an explicit individualized notice requirement imposed
on employers in the text of the Act, and examines the DOL regulations that
attempt to impose and enforce such a notice requirement. Part III describes the
pre-Ragsdale cases that approved the DOL's notice and penalty regulations.
Part IV describes Ragsdale.
Part V evaluates these conflicting positions by analyzing the rationales
behind the decisions to impose or not to impose employer notice requirements.
It argues that courts should require employers to notify employees whether
employer-provided leave runs concurrently with or consecutively to FMLA
leave, but that the penalty provision in the regulation should be modified to
10. Cline v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 300-01 (4th Cir. 1998).
11. Plant v. Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 934-36 (6th Cir. 2000).
12. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 2000),
aff'd, 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
13. McGregor v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1307-08 (1 th Cir. 1999).
14. See Ragsdale,218 F.3d at 939.

15. 122 S.Ct. 1155 (2002).
16. Id. at 1165.
17. Id. at 1160-61.
18. See id. at 1167-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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require a factual showing of harm by aggrieved employees and to impose a
penalty equivalent to the harm suffered. This approach is consistent with the
majority opinion in Ragsdale. It also is consistent with the purpose of the
statute, which is to protect the job security of employees taking leave. The
approach imposes a minimal burden on employers: because employers retain the
right to designate employer leave as running concurrently with FMLA leave, the
only burden on employers is to notify employees of this designation at the
beginning of employees' leave. This approach confers a significant benefit on
employees because it enables them to effectively plan their leave and to keep
their jobs.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Family andMedical Leave Act
Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act for several purposes.
Primarily, Congress passed the FMLA in an effort to balancejob responsibilities
with the needs of families. 9 This balance includes promoting the stability and
economic security of families, along with the national interest in preserving
family integrity.2" To accomplish this, the FMLA grants employees leave for
qualifying medical and family reasons.2' The FMLA strives to achieve these
goals in a way that respects the legitimate interests of employers.'
To qualify for leave under the FMLA, an employee must meet several
requirements. First, the FMLA applies only to employers who engage in
interstate commerce and who employ fifty or more employees for each working
day during each of twenty or more calendar workweeks in the current or
preceding calendar year.' Second, an employee is eligible to take FMLA leave
if the employee has been employed: (1) for at least twelve months (the months
need not be consecutive); (2) for at least 1250 hours during the previous twelvemonth period;25 and (3) at a work site where fifty or more employees are
employed by the same employer within seventy-five miles of the work site.26
Third, an eligible employee may take leave under the FMLA if the leave: (1)

19. See 29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2000).
20. Id.
21. Id. § 2601(b)(2).
22. Id. § 2601(b)(3).
23. Id. § 261 1(4)(A)(i).

24. Id. § 261 l(2)(A)(i).
25. Id. § 261 l(2)(A)(ii).
26. Id. § 261 l(2)(B)(ii).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/4
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relates to the birth or care of the employee's newborn child;27 (2) is the result of
the placement of a child with the employee for adoption or foster care;2" (3)
concerns the care of an employee's child, spouse, or parent having a serious
health condition;29 or (4) is the result of the employee's serious health condition
when the employee is unable to perform the requirements of his or her job.3"
The FMLA guarantees eligible employees twelve weeks of leave in a oneyear period."' During these twelve weeks, the employer must maintain the
employee's group health coverage 2 and must grant leave to the employee, when
"medically necessary," on an intermittent or part-time basis. 33 Some employers
have adopted family leave policies with terms more generous than the statute
requires, such as policies that permit more than twelve weeks of leave per year.34
As long as these policies meet the statute's threshold requirements, leave taken
under them may be counted toward the twelve weeks of leave required by the
FMLA.35 The statute explicitly states that it provides a floor-not a ceiling-to
family leave policies.36
Following an employee's return from FMLA leave, the employee is entitled
to reinstatement to his or her former position or an equivalent position with the
same benefits and terms of employment. 37 The Act makes it unlawful for an
employer to "interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of" these rights.3" An
employerwho violates the FMLA is liable for compensation andbenefits lost "by
reason of the violation,"39' for other monetary losses incurred "as a direct result
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. § 2612(a)(1)(A).
Id. § 2612(a)(1)(B).
Id. § 2612(a)(1)(C).
Id. § 2612(a)(1)(D).
Id. § 2612(a)(1).
Id. § 2614(c)(1).
Id. § 2612(b)(1).
Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 122 S.Ct. 1155, 1160 (2002) (citing

D. CANTOR ET AL., U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND

EMPLOYERS: FAMILYANDMEDICALLEAVE SURVEYS 2000 UPDATE 5-10,5-12, available

at http://www.dol.gov/asp/finlatmain2000.htm).
35. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2,180, 2,230 (Jan.
6, 1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825) ("[E]mployers may designate paid leave as
FMLA leave and offset the maximum entitlements under the employer's more generous
policies.").
36. 29 U.S.C. § 2653 (2000) ("Nothing in this Act... shall be construed to
discourage employers from adopting or retaining leave policies more generous than any
policies that comply with the requirements under this Act.").
37. Id. § 2614(a)(1).
38. Id. § 2615(a)(1).
39. Id. §2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(I) (discussinghow "wages, salary, employment benefits,
or other compensation denied or lost to such employee by reason of the violation" can
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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of the violation,"' and for "appropriate" equitable relief, including employment,
reinstatement, and promotion. 1 Job security is, thus, the essence of the FMLA.42
The FMLA explicitly requires employees to provide employers notice of
their intention to take leave for a qualifying FMLA reason.4 ' The statute also
contains a notice requirement for employers: employers must display a poster
containing certain excerpts from the FMLA to inform employees of their FMLA
rights.' This is the only statutory notice requirement imposed on employers; as
will be discussed below, DOL regulations additionally require that employers
45
notify their employees that the employees' leave is covered under the FMLA.
Although the Act imposes minimal notification requirements on employers,
the FMLA directs the Secretary of Labor to "prescribe such regulations as are
necessary to carry out [the substantive provisions of] subchapter I. Seizing on
this authority and the lack of employer notice provisions in the text of the FMLA,
the DOL has issued several regulations which require that an employer provide
an employee with notice that employer provided leave is FMLA leave both in
situations where the employee is taking paid leave and where the employee is

be granted).
40. Id. § 2617(a)(1)(A)(i)(II) (granting "any actual monetary losses sustained by
the employee as a direct result of the violation, such as the cost of providing care, up to
a sum equal to twelve weeks of wages or salary for the employee"). These damages can
be doubled ifthe employer did not act in good faith. In such cases, the statute provides
for "an additional amount as liquidated damages equal to the sum of the amount
described in clause (i) (i.e., wages, benefits, etc.)[,j and the interest" on those amounts
also can be awarded. See id. § 2617 (a)(1)(A)(iii).
41. Id. § 2617(a)(1)(B) (providing for equitable relief).
42. Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 2, at 1215.
43. 29 U.S.C. § 2612(e)(1) (2000). The precise components of such notice,
however, are unclear. See Timothy Stewart Bland, The RequiredContent ofEmployees'
Notice to Employers ofthe Needfor Leave Under the FMLA, 12 LAB. LAW. 235 (1996).
44. 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2000); see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.300(a) (2001) ("Every
employer covered by the FMLA is required to post and keep posted on its premises, in
conspicuous places where employees are employed, whether or not it has any 'eligible'
employees, a notice explaining the Act's provisions and providing information
concerning the procedures for filing complaints of violations of the Act with the Wage
and Hour Division. The notice must be posted prominently where it can be readily seen
by employees and applicants for employment. Employers may duplicate the text of the
notice contained in Appendix C of this part, or copies of the required notice may be
obtained from local offices of the Wage and Hour Division. The poster and the text must
be large enough to be easily read and contain fully legible text."); 29 C.F.R. § 825 app.
C (2001) (sample posting notice).
45. See infra Part II(B).
46. 29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2000).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/4
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taking unpaid leave.47 These regulations also provide for significant
consequences if employers fail to provide such notice.48
B. DepartmentofLaborRegulations
The DOL has mandated that "[i]n all circumstances, it is the employer's
responsibility to designate leave, paid or unpaid, as FMLA-qualifying, and to
give notice of the designation to the employee as provided in this section."49 In
two separate regulations, the DOL provides that failure to notify an employee
that leave taken pursuant to the employer's leave policy is also designated as
FMLA leave will result in the employee retaining her entitlement to twelve
weeks of leave under the FMLA.5 °
The first regulation is 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(c). In this provision, the DOL
applies the principle to paid leave under an employer-provided leave policy,
stating:
If the employer has the requisite knowledge to make a determination
that the paid leave is for an FMLA reason at the time the employer
either gives notice of the need for leave or commences leave and fails
to designate the leave as FMLA leave (and so notify the employee in
accordance with paragraph (b)), the employer may not designate leave
as FMLA leave retroactively, and may designate only prospectively as
of the date of notification to the employee of the designation.5'
In such circumstances, the employee is subject to the full protections of the Act,
but none of the employee's time off preceding the notice to the employee of the
designation may be counted against the twelve week FMLA leave entitlement.
The DOL stated that this provision forbidding retroactive designation of leave as
being covered under the FMLA was meant "to eliminate protracted 'after the
fact' disputes. 52
The second regulation requiring employers to give notice to their employees
is 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a). In this provision, the DOL applies the principle to
unpaid employer-provided leave policies, stating that "[i]f an employee takes

47. See Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 936-37 (8th Cir.
2000), afid, 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).

48. Id. at 937.
49. 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a) (2001).

50. See id. §§ 825.208(c), 825.700(a).
51. See id. § 825.208(c).
52. The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2,180, 2,207 (Jan.
6, 1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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paid or unpaid leave and the employer does not designate the leave as FMLA
leave, the leave taken does not count against an employee's FMLA
entitlement.""3 The DOL also stated, however, that, as long as the employer
designated the leave as FMLA leave, the time off could run concurrently with the
employer-provided leave policy. 4 Both Sections 825.208(c) and 825.700(a)
clearly require employers to designate leave as being covered under the FMLA.
Absent such notice, the employee remains entitled to the entire twelve weeks of
leave.

III. IMPOSING A NOTICE REQUIREMENT ON EMPLOYERS
Prior to the Supreme Court's 2002 decision inRagsdalev. Wolverine World

Wide, Inc., s the federal circuits were split on the issue of whether the DOL
penalty provisions for violation of its employer-notice requirement were
consistent with the statutory language of the FMLA. Two circuits-the Fourth56
and the SixthS--enforced the DOL regulations and required employers to notify
employees that their leave was covered under the FMLA.
Plant v. Morton International,Inc. 8 was a 2000 Sixth Circuit decision.

Philip Plant was injured in a work-related motor vehicle accident in February
1995." 9 Plant took a paid leave of absence from work until September 1995.60
On April 26, 1996, Plant took another paid leave from work when he aggravated
his back and leg injuries while at work. 6' Approximately six weeks into Plant's
second leave of absence, Morton fired Plant, citing poor performance.62
Plant sued under the FMLA, 61 the Americans with Disabilities Act,' and
state wrongful discharge laws.6" The district court granted summary judgment
66
to Morton on all counts, and Plant appealed to the Sixth Circuit.

53. 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) (2001).
54. See The Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993, 60 Fed. Reg. 2,180, 2,230
(Jan. 6, 1995) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 825).

55. 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
56. See Cline v.Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 294, 300-01 (4th Cir. 1998).
57. See Plant v.Morton Int'l, Inc., 212 F.3d 929, 934-36 (6th Cir. 2000).
58. Id.
59. Id. at 932.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. 29 U.S.C.§§ 2601-2654 (2000).
64. 42 U.S.C.§§ 12101-12213 (2000).
65. OHIo REV. CODE ANN.§ 4112.02 (Anderson 2001).
66. Plant,212 F.3d at 933.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/4
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On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court ofAppeals, Plant argued that his 1996
injury qualified as a "serious health condition," entitling him to twelve weeks of
FMLA leave. 7 He argued that Morton had violated the FMLA by only
providing six weeks of leave. 68 Plant admitted that he would not have been able
to return to work within the twelve weeks provided by the FMLA, but alleged
that he should be able to "stack" the twelve weeks ofFMLA leave on top of the
six weeks of disability leave that Morton had provided, for a total of eighteen
weeks.69 In any event, he argued that his FMLA leave should not have started
to run until Morton notified him that it was designating his leave as FMLA leave,
which Morton never did.7"
The Sixth Circuit began by acknowledging that "[t]he FMLA makes it clear
that employer-provided leave, whether paid or unpaid, may be counted toward
the twelve-week minimum required by statute."' The court then pointed out,
however, that the DOL had elaborated on this issue in its regulations.72 Citing
29 C.F.R § 825.208, the Sixth Circuit stated that the DOL regulations provide
that "[i]n all circumstances, it is the employer's responsibility to designate leave,
paid or unpaid, as FMLA-qualifying, and to give notice ofthe designation to the
employee,"73 and that if the employer failed to give such notice within two days
of learning of the employee's qualifying reason for leave,74 the employer may not
designate it as FMLA leave.7'
The Sixth Circuit explicitly upheld the DOL regulations.76 The court found
that Section "825.208(c) evinces a reasonable understanding of the FMLA,
reflecting Congress's concern with providing ample notice to employees of their
rights under the statute."7 Furthermore, the court noted that Section 825.208(c)
was not inconsistent with legislative intent simply because it created the
possibility that employees might receive more than twelve weeks of leave in one
twelve-month period.7" This ruling was based on the fact that the FMLA
standards were intended to be minimum labor standards.79 The court concluded
that the DOL "regulations are valid and forbid employers from retroactively

67. Id. at 934.
68. Id.
69. Id.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2612(c)-(d) (2000)).
Id. at 934-35.
Id. at 935 (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.208(a) (2001)).
Id.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 936.

77. Id. at 935 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2000)).
78. Id.
79. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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designating FMLA leave if they have not given proper notice to their employees
that their statutory entitlement period has begun to run."8 Based on this
conclusion, the court held that Plant was not precluded from asserting an FMLA
claim, since his employer, Morton, did not notify him that his leave was covered
under the FMLA.8 In essence, Plant was still entitled to his twelve weeks of
FMLA leave.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar decision in Cline v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.8" Keith Cline was diagnosed with a brain tumor.8 3 Prior
to taking medical leave for surgery from his employer, Wal-Mart, he submitted
forms to Wal-Mart requesting accrued vacation leave and medical leave." The
medical leave form provided that leave for "medical" reasons was designated as
FMLA leave.85 Approximately twelve weeks after Cline began his leave, he
returned to work, but was promptly demoted, then fired. 6 He sued under the
FMLA and ADA, and obtained a judgment for nearly $700,000.87
Wal-Mart appealed to the Fourth Circuit, arguing that the medical leave
form that Cline had signed put him on notice that his vacation days were to be
designated as part of his twelve weeks of FMLA leave.88 The court, however,
disagreed, finding that "[a]lthough the form explained that leave for 'medical'
reasons was designated as FMLA leave, it said nothing about vacation leave, and
a reasonable employee reviewing the form would have no idea that vacation
leave was designated."8 9 The court, therefore, held that the DOL regulations
discussed above required that Cline's vacation and FMLA leave would run
consecutively rather than concurrently, and that Wal-Mart violated the FMLA by
demoting him prior to the expiration of his total leave time.9"
In addition to the Fourth and Sixth Circuits, two federal district courts also
upheld the DOL regulations prohibiting employers from retroactively designating
leave as FMLA-qualifying leave.9' As discussed in Part IV, however, all of these

80. Id. at 936.
81. See id.

82. 144 F.3d 294 (4th Cir. 1998).
83. Id. at 298.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 301.

86. Id. at 299.
87. Id. at 300.
88. Id.

89. Id. at 301.
90. Id.

91. Ritchie v. Grand Casinos of Miss., 49 F. Supp. 2d 878, 880-81 (S.D. Miss.
1999); Chan v. Loyola Univ. Med. Ctr., No. 97 C 3170, 1999 WL 1080372, at *10

(N.D. Ill.
Nov. 23, 1999).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/4
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decisions have effectively been overruled by the Supreme Court's 2002 decision
in Ragsdalev. Wolverine World Wide, Inc.,92 discussed infra.
IV. REFUSING TO IMPOSE A NOTICE REQUIREMENT ON EMPLOYERS
Prior to the Supreme Court's Ragsdale decision, two federal circuits (the
Eighth93 and the Eleventh 94) and three federal district courts9 had held that the
DOL regulations enforcing pre-leave designation by the employer were
inconsistent with the statutory language of the FMLA. Because the circuit and
Supreme Court decisions inRagsdalecollectively address all the issues discussed
in the other cases, this Part will focus exclusively on the Ragsdale decisions.
The plaintiff, Tracy Ragsdale, requested medical leave from the defendant,
Wolverine, after she was diagnosed with Hodgkin's disease. 9' Wolverine's
generous leave policy permitted Ragsdale to take seven months of unpaid sick
leave.97 An employee who wanted this leave would be granted an initial leave
of up to thirty days; she then would have to submit monthly requests for thirtyday extensions of her leave.9" Ragsdale submitted six additional requests and
exhausted her seven months of leave. 9 Wolverine never notified Ragsdale that
she was eligible for FMLA leave, however, or that her FMLA leave would run
concurrently with her sick leave.' °°
After Ragsdale had taken the seven months of sick leave that Wolverine's
plan entitled her to, she requested an additional thirty-day extension.' 0'
Wolverine told Ragsdale that she had exhausted all of her available leave and
was not entitled to any more time off.' 2 Ragsdale then requested that she be

92. 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
93. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 938 (8th Cir. 2000),
afid, 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002).
94. McGregor v. Autozone, Inc., 180 F.3d 1305, 1307-08 (11th Cir. 1999).
95. Schloer v. Lucent Tech., Inc., No. CIV 99-3392, 2000 WL 128698, at *1(D.
Md. Jan. 21, 2000); Covey v. Methodist Hosp. of Dyersburg, Inc., 56 F. Supp. 2d 965,
970 (W.D. Tenn. 1999); Neal v. Children's Habilitation Ctr., No. 97 C 7717, 1999 WL
706117, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 10, 1999); see also Donnellan v. New York City Transit
Auth., No. 98 Civ. 1096 (BSJ), 1999 WL 527901, at **4-5 (S.D.N.Y. July 22, 1999)
(criticizing the regulations but finding for the employer on narrower ground).
96. Ragsdale, 122 S. Ct. at 1159.
97. Id.
98. Id.; see also Ragsdale,218 F.3d at 935.
99. Ragsdale, 122 S. Ct. at 1159.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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allowed to work fewer hours, but Wolverine denied her request. 3 Ragsdale did
not return to work, and Wolverine fired her.'
Ragsdale sued, arguing that Wolverine's failure to designate her sick leave
as FMLA leave entitled her to an additional twelve weeks of FMLA leave after
her seven months of sick leave had expired." 5 Wolverine conceded that it had
not designated Ragsdale's sick leave as FMLA leave, but argued that it had
complied with the FMLA by giving Ragsdale thirty weeks of leave-more than
twice what the FMLA required.'0 6 The parties filed cross motions for summary
judgment. 1 7 The district court granted Wolverine's motion, reasoning that the
regulation requiring leave to run consecutively, absent an employer designation
that the leave would run concurrently, would require Wolverine to offer Ragsdale
more than twelve weeks of FMLA leave, and, therefore, was inconsistent with
the statute. 0 8
The Eighth Circuit agreed and affirmed. 0 9 The court looked to other
sections of the FMLA to demonstrate that Congress detailed specific notice
requirements when it deemed such requirements necessary.'0 For example, the
court noted that the FMLA details the specific notice requirements that
employees must abide by when they request leave."' Also, the employer is
specifically required by statute to notify an employee if holding open that
employee's position would be a "substantial and grievous economic injury to the
operations of the employer," and the employer cannot restore the employee to her
past position upon her return." 2 The Eighth Circuit concluded that since
Congress obviously knew how to include a notice requirement, and did not do
so here, it must have intended no notice requirement." 3
The Eighth Circuit also examined the legislative history for insight as to
whether employers must designate their employees' leave as falling under the
provisions of the FMLA." The court found that "the FMLA was intended only
to be a statute that provided a minimum labor standard; an assurance that

103. Id.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 938 (8th Cir. 2000),
af'd, 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002) ("The terms of the statute contemplate only that the
employer will be required to provide a 'total' of twelve weeks of unpaid leave.").
I10. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 939 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2614(b)(1)(A) (2000)).
113. Id.
114. Id.
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employers would provide employees with twelve weeks of leave every year.""' 5
The court concluded that any other reading ofthe statute would be contrary to the
compromise Congress reached when it passed the FMLA." 6 The court cited a
report from the House of Representatives which stated that:
[t]he amount of time available for leave also reflects a compromise.
The leave period was reduced to 12 weeks in response to concerns
raised by employers who maintained that it was significantly easier to
adjust work schedules or find temporary replacements over the shorter
time period. While not ideal from the employees' perspective, a
twelve week minimum represents a middle ground between the family
needs of workers and an employer's business needs." 7
Thus, the court held that the DOL regulations could impermissibly force an
employer to provide more leave than the twelve weeks required by statute."'
The Eighth Circuit also pointed out, however, that it was not completely
striking down the DOL employer notice requirements." 9 The court noted that in
some cases such notice is necessary. 20 For example, the court stated that notice
may be necessary where the sole reason the employee exceeded her FMLA leave
was because the employer failed to notify her that she was using her FMLA
leave, and if she would have known, she would have returned to work.' 2' Also,
the court noted that notice may be required where the leave is anticipated, and
lack ofnotice would interfere with the employee's ability to plan and use future
FMLA leave.'"
Ragsdale appealed to the Supreme Court. The Court, in a 5-4 decision
authored by Justice Kennedy, affirmed, ' 2n holding that the DOL's penalty for
violation of its notice rule was inconsistent with the statutory language of the
FMLA, that it exceeded the DOL's authority under that statute,' 24 and that it
consequently was not entitled to deference.'" First, the Court addressed, but did

115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. (citing H.R. REP. No. 102-135(1), at 37 (1991)).
118. See id.

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 939-40.
122. Id. at 940.
123. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1155, 1158 (2002).
124. Id. at 1159.
125. Id. at 1160-61 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Ress. Def. Council, Inc.,

467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984), and its progeny). For thorough discussions of Chevron
deference, see Richard A. Bales, Compulsory Employment Arbitration andthe EEOC,
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not resolve, the issue of whether the DOL has the statutory authority under the
FMLA to issue regulations requiring employers to provide individual employees
with notice of their rights under the statute, because the text of the statute only
requires the collective notice provided by posting a sign.'26 Instead, the Court
focused on the narrower issue concerning the penalty imposed
by the DOL for
2 7
noncompliance with its employer notice requirements.
The Court advanced five arguments in support of its holding that the DOL
penalties were invalid. First, the Court stated that the penalty is incompatible
with the comprehensive remedial provisions of the statute, which provide only
equitable relief and remedies for actual damages in most cases. 2 The DOL
regulations, however, created an "irrebuttable presumption" that an employee
29
who had not received the requisite notice "deserves 12 more weeks" of leave.
The Court reasoned, however, that this is inconsistent with the statute because
it "relieves employees of the 'burden of proving any real impairment of their
rights and resulting prejudice."' 3 In this case, for example, even if Wolverine
had complied with the DOL's notice requirement, Ragsdale would not have been
able to return to work until after her thirty weeks of employer-provided sick
leave had run.'' Thus, according to the Court, she had suffered no injury which
would entitle her to damages (or an extension of leave) under the statute, and the
DOL's regulations giving her such damages and a leave extension were
32
inconsistent with the statute.
Second, the Court rejected the DOL's argument that a "categorical penalty
requiring the employer to grant more leave is easier to administer than one
involving a fact-specific inquiry into what steps the employee would have taken
had the employer given the required notice."' 33 Regulations adopted for
"administrative convenience," stated the Court, must be consistent with the
organic statute. In this case, the DOL's regulations were not.' Moreover, the
matter to be presumed in a legal presumption 3 must be true in most cases, or the

27 PEPP. L. REv. 1, 26-28 (1999); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy ofChevron: Step Two
Reconsidered,72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1253, 1256-60 (1997). See generally Thomas W.
Merrill, Textualism and the Future of the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351
(1994).
126. Ragsdale, 122 S. Ct. at 1160-61.
127. Id. at 1161.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 1162.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 1162-63.
135. For an extensive discussion of presumptions and inferences, see Anna Laurie
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/4
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reason for the presumption disappears. 36 The Court reasoned that no showing
had been made here that most employees provided with notice would not have
suffered injury.' 3' To the contrary, the Court argued, the DOL's presumption
likely would be true in only a small minority of cases.'
The Court's third argument for invalidating the DOL's regulations was that
it gave non-notified employees more than the twelve weeks of leave to which the
statute entitled them. 39 The DOL regulations would have given Ragsdale fortytwo weeks of leave: the thirty weeks of sick leave provided by her employer,
plus the twelve weeks of FMLA leave which the DOL regulations would require
to run consecutively as a penalty for the employer's noncompliance with the
notice regulation."4 Moreover, the Court dismissed the argument that employers
must provide more than twelve weeks of leave only when they fail to comply
with the notice requirement, because, according to the Court, that rationale could
be used to justify a penalty of twenty-four or thirty-six or forty-eight weeks.' 4'
by the statute, reasoned the
Anything greater than the twelve weeks provided
42
Court, would be inconsistent with the statute.
Fourth, the Court ruled that the DOL penalty was disproportionate and
inconsistent with the penalty imposed by the statute for an employer's
noncompliance with the statute's posting requirement. 4 3 Thatprovisionprovides
for a penalty of a $100 fine. 44 The additional twelve weeks of punitive leave
imposed by the DOL's regulations, however, created a "much heavier" sanction
than the sanction imposed by statute and, therefore, was inconsistent with the
45
statute.1

Bryant & Richard A. Bales, Using the Same Actor "Inference" in Employment
DiscriminationCases, 1999 UTAH L. REV. 255, 281-83 (1999).
136. Ragsdale, 122 S. Ct. at 1163. One of the most common reasons courts create
legal presumptions is probability: "[P]roof of fact B renders the inference of the
existence of fact A so probable that it is sensible and timesaving to assume the truth of
fact A until the adversary disproves it." MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 343 (John William
Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); see also Bryant & Bales, supranote 135, at 282; Edmund M.
Morgan, Some ObservationsConcerningPresumptions,44 HARV. L. REV. 906, 929-30

(1931).
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Ragsdale, 122 S.Ct. at 1163.
Id.
Id. at 1163-64.
Id. at 1164.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2619 (b) (2000)).
Id.
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Fifth, the Court cited the statute's proscription against "discourag[ing]
employers from adopting or retaining leave policies more generous than" those
required by the FMLA.' 4 The Court reasoned that the severe and across-theboard penalty imposed by the DOL regulations might cause employers to
discontinue their more-generous leave policies, and, therefore, is inconsistent
with the statute. 47
Justice O'Connor, in a dissent joined by three other justices, advanced five
counter-arguments. First, she argued that requiring employers to provide
individualized notice to employees is necessary to implement the FMLA's
provisions, because individualized notice ensures that employees are aware of
their FMLA rights and facilitates employees in planning their leaves.'
Moreover, "the Secretary's power to create such a [notice] requirementmust also
include a power to enforce it in some way." 49
Second, O'Connor argued that the statutory requirement that an employee
show actual harm before receiving damages for an employer's failure to provide
leave does not preclude the DOL from prescribing a different type of penalty for
a different type of noncompliance. 5 ' To the contrary, the existence of other
remedies within the FMLA statute--such as the $100 fine for noncompliance
with posting requirements-indicates that Congress did not intend for the "actual
harm" standard to be exclusive.'15
Third, O'Connor rejected the majority's argument that twelve "weeks of
additional leave is too great a punishment because few employees will have
actually suffered this much harm from the employer's failure to give
individualized notice."' 52 The Court is bound, O'Connor reasoned, to defer to
the DOL's judgment of the harms likely to result from an employer's failure to
give notice, so long as that judgment is reasonable. 53 O'Connor concluded that
the twelve weeks of additional leave was reasonable, and that it, therefore, should
be enforced.'54
Fourth, O'Connor rejected the argument that the penalty was inconsistent
with the statute because it would exceed the twelve weeks ofstatutorily-provided
leave. ' An employer may avoid this penalty, O'Connor noted, simply by

146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

Id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 2653 (2000)).
Id. at 1164-65.
Id. at 1165-67 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1167 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1168 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
Id. at 1168-69 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1169 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
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providing the requisite notice.' 56 Moreover, the penalty would no more extend
an employer's obligations under the statute than would a fine or any other sort
57
of remedy.
Finally, O'Connor rejected the argument that the penalty would discourage
employers from providing more leave than the FMLA requires.*" This provision
should not be interpreted, she argued, as prohibiting the DOL from implementing
otherwise-valid regulations to secure enforcement of the statute.'59 Moreover,
because an employer may avoid the penalty easily by simply providing notice,
she concluded that it was unlikely that the penalty would deter many employers
from providing more generous leave policies.'"
V. ANALYSIS
A. The Supreme Court Opinion in Ragsdale
The majority opinion in Ragsdale is hardly a model of clarity. Moreover,
because it garnered only five votes, it is also potentially unstable. The opinion
left two issues completely undecided.
The first open issue is whether the DOL has the statutory authority to issue
regulations requiring employers to provide individualized notice to employees.
The four dissenters unequivocally concluded that the DOL does. The five-justice
majority expressly avoided the issue. Thus, if only one member of the majority
decides in a future case that the DOL does have this statutory authority, that will
be sufficient to carry the issue. Moreover, on this point the dissent has the
stronger argument; it makes little sense to give the DOL the statutory authority
to "prescribe such regulations as are necessary to carry out"'6' the substantive
provisions ofthe statute, and then to deprive the DOL of the authority to enforce
such regulations.' 62
The second open issue is whether the DOL is prohibited from imposing any
penalty for noncompliance with notice requirements that would extend an
employee's leave beyond the twelve weeks provided in the statute. Several of
the majority's arguments seem to support this view. 63 The majority's third
argument-that the regulatory penalty was an invalid extension ofthe statutorily

156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)
Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting)
Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)
Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)
Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting)
29 U.S.C. § 2654 (2000).
See Ragsdale, 122 S.Ct. at 1167 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
Id.
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mandated twelve weeks of leave'---would, on its face, prohibit any extension
of leave beyond the twelve weeks provided in the statute. Similarly, the
majority's fourth argument-that the regulatory penalty was disproportionate and
inconsistent with the statute's $100 penalty for an employer's noncompliance
with posting requirements 6 5 -would seem to prohibit any penalty that more than
marginally exceeds $100. Most leave extensions would easily cost the employer
more than $100, since the employer is obligated by statute to maintain the
employee's health insurance. 66 Finally, the majority's fifth argument-that
punitive regulations cannot discourage employers from adopting or retaining
leave policies more generous than those required by the FMLAS 7-- would
prohibit the imposition of any administrative penalty.
The majority's first two arguments, however, seem to reflect a more
flexible, nuanced view.'68 The first argument-that the punitive regulations were
invalid because they absolved employees of showing actual harm 69 -and the
second argument-that the categorical presumption adopted by the DOL was
invalid because it would be true only in a small number of cases 7 ---indicate that
the DOL has the statutory authority to require individualized notice, but that the
remedy for failing to give such notice must include a showing of individualized
harm.' Consistent with this approach, the majority stated that the appropriate
rule would "involve[] a fact-specific inquiry into what steps the employee would
'
This was also the
have taken had the employer given the required notice."172
73
approach taken by the Eighth Circuit.
Under this approach, the DOL simply needs to re-draft its regulations to
require, first, a factual showing of harm by aggrieved employees, and second, a
penalty equivalent to the harm suffered. This would dull the teeth of the DOL
regulations invalidated by the Ragsdale Court,'74 insofar as it would impose an

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

See supra notes 139-42 and accompanying text.
See supranotes 143-45 and accompanying text.
See 29 U.S.C. § 2614(c)(1) (2000).
See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
See 122 S.Ct. at 1167-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 128-32 and accompanying text.

170. See supra notes 133-38 and accompanying text.
171. See Ragsdale, 122 S. Ct. at 1167-68 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
172. Id. at 1162.

173. Ragsdale v. Wolverine Worldwide, Inc., 218 F.3d 933, 939 (8th Cir. 2000),
aff'd, 122 S. Ct. 1155 (2002) (permitting recovery when an "employer's failure to give
notice... interfere[s] with or [denies] an employee's substantive FMLA rights").
174. See Victoria Roberts, FMLA: EnforcementofFMLA Notice RegulationsLeft
Open afterRagsdale,AttorneysAgree, 59 DAILYLAB. REP. C-1 (March 27, 2002) (noting
that "attorneys agree that as a result of Ragsdale, the FMLA regulations on notice and
designation requirements have lost their punch"); Katherine H. Parker & Kathryn V.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/4
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additional burden on aggrieved employees and would decrease the penalty levied
on most noncompliant employers. It would, however, permit the DOL to
maintain its requirement of individualized notice.
B. The Rationalefor RequiringNotice
There are four reasons for requiring employers to give their employees
notice that leave is covered under the FMLA. First, such notice is a necessary
prerequisite to effectuation of the statute. Second, requiring notice is consistent
with the broad purposes of the FMLA. Third, employers are in a better position
than employees to know if an employee's leave is covered under the FMLA.
The first reason why employers should be required to give pre-leave notice
is that such notice is a necessary prerequisite to enforcement. The FMLA
contains a posting requirement,'75 but this posting is not comprehensive and
employees cannot reasonably be expected to be thereby put on notice of the
pages and pages of administrative regulations governing the statute.
Individualized notice is necessary so that employees may plan their leave in a
way that maximizes the possibility of a successful post-leave transition back into
the workplace.
One example is an employee who qualifies for intermittent leave.' 76
Katherine Parker and Kathryn Chandless explain:
If, for instance, an employee who must undergo medical treatments
every other week over the course of 12 weeks is not informed that her
intermittent absence qualifies as FMLA leave, she might take all of her
12 weeks consecutively and have not leave remaining for future
emergency. The inadequate notice of FMLA rights here may have a
causal connection to the inability of the employee to exercise her
FMLA-guaranteed rights. Thus, because, arguably, the employer's
failure to properly notify did interfere with the employee having all her
choices before her, some imposition of penalties against the employer
may be warranted, a position the [Ragsdale] [C]ourt noted "may be
'
reasonable."'

Chandless, Employers Should Proceed with Caution Despite Invalidation of FMLA
Notice Rule, 70 U.S. LAW WEEK 2659, 2660 (Apr. 23, 2002) (noting that it likely will

be the "rare" case in which an employee is awarded additional leave under the Supreme
Court's interpretation of the statute).
175. See 29 U.S.C. § 2619(a) (2000).
176. The FMLA entitles a person to take intermittent leave when "medically
necessary." Id. § 2612(b)(1) (2000).
177. Parker & Chandless, supranote 174, at 2660.
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Thus, employees who qualify for intermittent leave illustrate the need for preleave employer notification.
Such notification is desirable in other cases as well. 178 For example,
179
Wolverine's leave policy gave Tracy Ragsdale thirty weeks of sick leave.
Because Wolverine had not notified Ragsdale at the beginning of her leave that
her FMLA leave would run concurrently with her sick leave, DOL regulations
would have added to her thirty weeks of sick leave an additional twelve weeks
of FMLA leave. 80 This would have sufficed to permit Ragsdale to return to
work. The Supreme Court, of course, invalidated the regulations and "disentitled" Ragsdale to her right to return to work.'
Even under this
interpretation, however, prior notice would have had a salutary effect for
Ragsdale. Without such notice, employees have no way of knowing whether the
employer intends for the FMLA leave to run concurrently with, or consecutively
to, the employer's own leave policy. If Wolverine had told Ragsdale up front
that her leave would run concurrently, she would have known at the beginning
of her leave period that she was entitled only to thirty weeks of leave, and not to
the forty-two weeks that she would have received had the leave run
consecutively. Perhaps Ragsdale could have found a way to structure her leave
in a way that only would require her to miss thirty weeks of work; if so, she
could have retained herjob.8 2 Even if not, the prior notice would have given her
an opportunity to begin the process of looking for another job before her sick
leave expired. But because Wolverine did not provide her with notice until after
her sick leave had expired, she lost her job with no notice.

178. See, e.g., Schover v. SMC Pneumatics, Inc., No. IP99-1285-C-T/G, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12478 (S.D. Ind. Aug. 21, 2000); Mitchell v. Continental Plastic Containers,

Inc., No. C-1-97-412, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21465 (S.D. Ohio March 3, 1998).
179. Ragsdale v. Wolverine World Wide, Inc., 122 S. Ct. 1155, 1159 (2002).
180. Id.
181. Id. at 1165.
182. Shay Zeemer offers several other variations on this theme, such as:
Where the employee claims that the sole reason she exceeded her FMLA
leave was the employer's lack ofnotice, and with proper notice, the employee
would and could have returned to work at the end of twelve weeks;
Where the employee anticipated taking leave, such as for elective surgery, and
the employer's lack of notice caused the employee to take more than needed

at the current time;
Where the employee anticipated taking leave and lack of notice deprived the
employee of the opportunity to schedule the leave to coincide with work
holidays; [and]
Where the employee needed leave to care for a family member, and with
proper notice could have managed the leave differently by arranging for other
caregivers.
Zeemer, supra note 8, at 307-08 (footnotes omitted).
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The second reason why employers should be required to give pre-leave
notice is that such notice is consistent with the broad purposes of the FMLA.
The overriding purpose of the FMLA is job security.'83 Another important
purpose is to help employees balance family and work responsibilities." An
employee cannot be secure that her position will be available when she returns
to work, and cannot make informed decisions about balancing family and work
responsibilities, if she is not properly informed of the amount of time that she is
entitled to take off. Requiring employers to notify their employees is elementary
to achieving the central purposes of the statute.
Third, employers are in a better position than employees to know if an
employee's leave is covered under the FMLA. The FMLA makes it the
employer's responsibility to figure out if the employee's reason for taking time
off qualifies her for FMLA leave.' 5 Furthermore, the FMLA only applies to
employers who hire fifty or more employees. 8 6 Such employers are likely to
have human resource departments devoted to keeping track of employee leave.
Therefore, it should be routine for an employer to inquire as to the reason for the
requested leave, and then determine if it will qualify the employee for FMLA
leave. If it is a qualifying reason, the employer should promptly notify the
employee that she is entitled to twelve weeks of leave under the FMLA.
Moreover, the burden on employers of designating leave up front as running
either concurrently or consecutively is minimal. As Ragsdaleitself illustrates,
employers must make this determination eventually. In Ragsdale,the employer
waited until after the employee had exhausted her employer-provided leave
before informing her that she was not entitled to additional FMLA leave. It
would have taken little effort on the employer's part to have provided this notice
at the beginning, rather than the end, of the employer-provided leave. Indeed,
one would expect that an employer progressive enough to have a generous leave
policy would provide early notice as a matter of course, if for no other reason
than a self-serving desire to retain its valued employees.
C. The Rationalefor Not RequiringNotice
There are two reasons why notice requirements arguably should not be
imposed. The first is that either the notice requirements themselves, or the
penalties for noncompliance, might be inconsistent with the language of the
FMLA. As discussed in Part V.A, supra, however, one reading of the majority
opinion suggests that both the notice requirements and the penalties would be

183.
184.
185.
186.

29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2000); Aalberts & Seidman, supra note 2, at 1215.
29 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2000).
See id. § 2612(e)(1).
See id. § 2611(4)(A)(1).
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consistent with the statute so long as the applicable regulations require a factual
showing of harm by aggrieved employees, and the regulations impose a penalty
that does not exceed the harm suffered.
The second argument against imposing notice requirements is that notice
requirements, coupled with harsh penalties for noncompliance, may discourage
employers from providing leave policies that exceed the statutorily-required
minimum."' Employers may be unwilling to adopt their own leave policies if
they believe that they will be required to provide an additional twelve weeks of
leave on top of their own policy. The DOL has made it clear, however, that
FMLA leave can run concurrently with employer-provided leave policies.
Employers are only required to inform the employee taking time off that her
leave is covered under the FMLA. As discussed above, the burden of doing so
is minimal, because the employer will have to make this determination at some
point; under most circumstances it will be just as easy for the employer to
provide pre-leave notice as it would be for the employer to provide post-leave
notice. Therefore, the addition of this minimal requirement should not
discourage employers from providing leave policies oftheir own that exceed the
statutory requirements of the FMLA.
D. Proposal
The Authors believe that the DOL regulations should continue to require
that, within two days of the commencement of an employee's FMLA leave, an
employer that offers a more-generous leave policy must notify the employee
whether the FMLA leave runs concurrently with, or consecutive to, the
employer-provided leave. The penalty for an employer's noncompliance must
be modified, however, to comply with the Supreme Court's Ragsdale decision.
The Authors propose that the DOL modify 29 C.F.R. § 825.700(a) to require a
factual showing of harm by aggrieved employees and to impose a penalty
equivalent to the harm suffered. Thus, an aggrieved employee must allege (and
ultimately prove) not only that the notice provided by the employer was
insufficient but also that the employee's claimed damages could have been
avoided if the employee had received notice. Moreover, if the employee were
to prevail on her claim, the DOL would not be permitted to impose a penalty that
exceeded the employee's actual damages.
Imposing such a notice requirement on employers places very little
additional burden on employers above that which the FMLA already requires.

187. See Parker & Chandless, supranote 174, at 2660 (arguing that a ruling for the
plaintiff in Ragsdale "would have provided a disincentive for employers to give more
generous leave policies than required by law, a chilling effect in direct conflict with [3
congressional intent").
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss4/4
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Failing to impose a notice requirement on employers, however, would effectively
require every individual employee, at the risk of forfeiting herjob, to be familiar
enough with the FMLA and its attendant regulations to recognize that FMLA
leave may run concurrently with employer-provided leave, and to demand, prior
to taking leave, that the employer specify whether the leave to be taken will
qualify as FMLA leave. This is an unreasonable burden to put on employees
who, by definition, already are facing a major family event of some type.
VI. CONCLUSION
The implementation of the Family and Medical Leave Act has not been
perfect. Statutory ambiguity in the FMLA has raised many questions, including
the questions at issue here: whether employers are obligated to provide notice
to employees that their leave is covered under the FMLA, and, if so, how the
DOL may enforce such a notice requirement. While the Department of Labor
has attempted to resolve these issues by promulgating regulations that impose
and enforce employer notification requirements, the Supreme Court has struck
down the penalty provisions of these regulations as inconsistent with the
statutory language and with Congress' intent in enacting the FMLA.
The Authors believe that employer notice requirements are consistent with
the text and purpose of the FMLA, and that they are a necessary prerequisite to
the statute's effective implementation and enforcement. The DOL can and
should amend the provision struck by the Supreme Court. The amended
provision should require a factual showing of harm by aggrieved employees and
impose a penalty on noncompliant employers that is equivalent to the harm
suffered by the employee. This would impose an extremely minimal burden on
employers, would permit employees to effectively plan their leaves with minimal
risk of jeopardizing their jobs, and would further the overall purpose of the
FMLA, enabling employees to balance their work and family obligations.
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